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THE EXTENDED REPUBLIC AND THE CONTROL
OF MAJORITY FACTION: A CONTRAST
AND COMPARISON OF DE TOCQUEVILLE
AND THE AMERICAN LAWGIVERS

Anne Row ley*
In trod uction
The French political philosopher, Alexis de
Tocqueville, saw the endurance of American
democracy as a possible model that would enable
his countrymen to temper the ill effects of their
own democratic system.
Although he dia not
advocate that every aspect of the American model
should be strictly adhered to, he wrote about the
goodness of American laws and the wisdom of the
American Founding Fathers. Furthermore, as he
described the practical application. of their
ideology, de Tocqueville appeared to align himself
with most of their beliefs.
He disagreed, however, with one of the most
basic tenets of the American method of democracy.
In contrast to the view advocated by the
Founders, de Tocqueville did not support the
concept of the geographical extension of republics
serving as the control for violence of factions and
tyranny of the majority.
Factions, especially majority factions, are
natural to human behavior and increase rapidly in
democracies where the will of man is relatively
unrestrained. Factions also serve as the violent
vehicle for democracy's self-destructive tenden*Anne is a junior in Political Science. She
is a Truman Scholar and one of the Vice-Presidents
of Pi Sigma Alpha, Beta-Mu chapter.
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cies.
This propensity of factions to flourish in
liberty makes philosophical speculation on how
their effects can be controlled a central issue in
the politics of preserving and perpetuating popular government. For this reason it is extremely
important that de Tocqueville's objections to the
method prescribed by the Founders be examined
and understood. The significance of his views is
increased because de Tocqueville observed American society and political institutions after the
advent of the Founders.
The Size of the Sphere
The lack of harmony between de Tocqueville
and the American Founders on whether extending
the physical sphere of a republic controls the
effects of faction, has its foundation in a difference in the interpretation of the history of democracy and in the role of small republics in that
history. The Founders believed that small democracies, including the pure democracies of the
Greek city-states, had been scenes of contention,
strife, and tumult. J ames Madison wrote, "They
have been as short in their'l lives as they have
been violent in their deaths." . .
Conversely, de Tocqueville felt that small
republics were basically content and happy.
Their resources were directed to the internal
well-being of their people, they had no vain
dreams of glory, and the conditions among their
citizens were rou ghly eq ual.
( This opinion had
also been expressed by Montesquieu. )
De
Tocqueville further theorized that if the entire
world were composed of small democracies, there
would be no larger states to attack the small
ones, and humanity would be free and happy.
He reasoned that there is little attraction to
ambition in small republics because resources are
too limited to be concentrated in the hands of one
man, and, even if a tyrant did arise, in a small
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democracy it would not be difficult for the people
to unite and overthrow him.
De Tocqueville did not deny that when tyranny exists in a small republic it is more vicious
than in a large republic. The limited size of the
smaller nation causes despotism to affect everything within the national realm. He did claim that
tyranny is rare in small democracies because they
are the "cradle of ¥berty," and freedom is their
"natural condition."
De Tocqueville's stand on large nations,
especially large republics, is opposite to his
opinion of small nations. He admitted that ideas
circulate more freely in large nations, and that
they contribute more to the increase of knowledge, civilization, and important discoveries than
in small republics because they are able to concentrate their national resources. In his opinion,
they also have the advantage of being stronger
militarily than smaller democracies and are therefore able to withstand conquest.
Nevertheless,
for de Tocqueville, these positive characteristics
did not counter the vices of large republics such
as great wealth in the midst of dire poverty,
huge cities, depraved morals, individual egoism,
and a complication of interests.
He concluded
that these are some of the reasons that "history
gives no ex~ple of a large nation long remaining
a republic."
Ambition grows with the power of
the state and all of the passions destructive to
democracy also grow with the increase of its
territory.
De Tocqueville rejected the basic
premise of the Founders and followed the prescription of Rousseau, in that if a free people are
to remain chaste in their c~vic virtue, the size of
the republic must be small.
How then, did de Tocqueville explain the
existence of the extended republic of the United
States under this philosophy? He claimed that,
although it was true that the United State3 had
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been the only extended republic in history of any
duration, this phenomenon had occurred because
Americans combined the positive aspects of both
the large and the small republic.
He declared
that the United States "is free and happy like a
small natio~" and "glorious and strong like a
great one."
The positive characteristics of one
sphere make up for the negative characteristics of
the other. Because the United States is strong
defensively, it can focus on internal improvements
while public spirit in the union is only an extension of patriotism in the states and townships.
Similarly political passions don't spread to engulf
the nation 7because they are broken up at the
state level.
There is no doubt that de Tocqueville
favored the characteristics of the small republic
over those of the large republic. This view may
have been partially determined by his cultural
background and by his acceptance of the thought
of certain political philosophers as well as by his
understanding of history. To comprehend why he
rejected the large republic as a remedy for faction requires a deeper analysis. Therefore, an
overview of the American Founders' plan of the
extended republic is necessary.
The Founders' Plan of Extension
The Founders expected the outcome of the
U. S. Constitution to be the establishment of a
confederation of the states. Like de Tocqueville,
they did not view this larger union as a consolidation that would res'glt in the loss of each
state's political identity.
According to Alexander
Hamilton, this idea of being able to extend the
sphere of a republic through confederation was
supported by Montesquieu, and Hamilton quoted
him in "Federalist Number 9":
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It is very probable that mankind
would have been obliged at length to
live constantly under the government of
a single person, had they not contrived
a kind of constitution that has all of
the internal advantages of a republican,
together with the external force of
monarchial,
government.
I mean a
Confederate Republic.
This form of government is a
convention by which several smaller
states agree to become members of a
larger one, which they intend to form.
It is a kind of assemblage of societies
that constitute a new one, capable of
increasing, by means of new associations, till they arrive to such a degree
of power as to be able to pr0'9ide for
the security of the united body.
It was Hamilton's conviction that if such a
method of extending the sphere of republics was
not possible, then the only alternatives would be
an authoritarian regime or a small, pure democracy. Both alternatives, in his opinion, offered
only gloomy prospects because if the sphere of
democracy could not be enlarged, then it would
be impossible for each nalwn to even be the size
of the state of New York.

The American lawgivers not only believed
that a confederate republic was possible for
America, but they also felt that it was an absolute necessity for several reasons.
First, it
seemed logical to them that to take care of national concerns, like defense, a strong, energetic
national government was a prerequisite. Second,
Hamilton and other framers of the Constitution
saw the choice between a large or small republic
as a choice between the purse and the sword.
They claimed that large republics promote commerce and economic prosperity while small republics are militaristic because the people are preoc-
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cupied with governing, and they don't have time
for commerce.
Instead they fight 1IJ.l0ng themselves and with other small republics.
The most critical reason given for an extended republic is the effect that the Founders
felt it would have on both majority and minority
factions.
To them a majority faction was especially to be feared in a democracy because it is
intolerant of the rights of minorities and individuals. James Madison stated that tempering majority
faction was the main purpose of the Constitution:
If a faction consists of less than a
majority, relief is supplied by the
republican principle, which enables the
majority to defeat its sinister views by
regular vote. It may clog the administration, it may convulse society; but it
will be unable to execute and mask its
violence under the forms of the Constitution. When a majority is included in
a faction, the form of popular government on the other hand, enables it to
sacrifice to its ruling passion or interset both the public good and the rights
of other citizens. To secure the public
good and private rights against the
danger of such a faction, and at the
same time to preserve the spirit and the
form of popular government, is then the
great objfft to which our inquiries are
directed.

Factions cannot be destroyed without also
destroying their causes which are human nature
and liberty.
Obviously, "the rememdy is worse
than the disease." All that can realistically be
done to solve the problem of factions is to control
their effects by extending the orbit of the republic.
Enlarging the geographical area of the
republic would help to restrain factions in two
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ways: first, principle of representation in the
broadened sphere would allow the people to elect
men of a more noble character than that of the
masses themselves, while the broadened republic
would provide a larger selection of candidates;
and second, the enlarged sphere would take in a
greater variety of parties and interests, making it
less probable that "a majority of the whole would
have a common mottfl to invade the rights and
property of others."
This multiplicity of interests would cause the majority to be broken up
into a number of smaller factions that would,
because of ambition and greed, compete with and
balance each other.
The most dangerous and violent factions in
Madison's opinion are factions that arise from the
unequal l~istribution of "property," or class
factions.
He believed, however, that the
extended republic offered a way to check these
factions as well.
The diversity of economic
activity that is natural to a large geographical
area creates multiple factions of varied economic
interest that "cut across class lines." Association
would arise from particular rather than from class
interests.
Such an association would be impossible in a small republic where economic activity
is homogenous and usually dfmited to a small
number of occupational fields.
Under the Founders' plan of extension the
majority still exists and the people are still sovereign, but the majority is a "mixed" majority of
different interests and different classes.
Consequently, it also is a neutral majority and one
that the founders b1~eved would generally rule
for the common good.
Ultimately, the Founding Fathers knew that
if a majority was determined to get its way, for
whatever purpose, it would eventually be able to
do so.
They did hope to place constitutional
obstacles in the way of such factions. These
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would be based upon the idea of the extended
republic, and would include - representation, the
doctrine of ennumerated powers, and the national
judiciary.
The lawgivers were persuaded that
even if a majority were able to circumvent the
law, they might be restrained by religion and
morality, but the Founders also realized that
these ideals could fail, leaving no restraint upon
the will of the majority.
De Tocqueville's Observations and Argument
Alexis de Tocqueville read the writings of
the American Founders extensively, and he
observed the large middle class in America that is
considered to be the result of their thought. He
also examined the leveling effect that American
ideology had upon such measures as land reform
and education in the United States. In spite of
all of these effects, he still found ample reason to
argue with the Founders' premise that a large,
extended republic is able to control the effects of
factions.
Although de Tocqueville apparently conceded
that a majority composed of all classes and many
interests is a reality in the United States, he felt
that the mere existence of any kind of majority is
in and of itself a danger.
Unlike Madison he
believed that the majority doesn't constitute a
faction but that any majority is always in peril of
being Pl9'uaded to join the cause of minority
factions.
De Tocqueville was a great believer in the
sovereignty of the people.
Still, he did not
share the Founders' belief that a majority in an
extended republic generally seeks the public
good.
In his opinion the majority could also
serve as a mechanism of tyranny that is intolerant
of the minority or the individual that dares to
speak out against its will. In this role, it affects
and often debases the character and thought of
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the nation and imbues national leaders with a kind
of "courtie spirit" that is intent upon flattering
19
the people.
De Tocqueville's views of the majority are
strengthened because he felt that there were few
if any obstacles placed in its path. He rejected
the idea that representation allows the people to
elect men superior to themselves.
It was his
contention that they elect men in their own image
and that often the very nature of the majority,
combined with the "courtier spirit," causes leaders to be elected that corrupt themselves and are
actually inferior to the general public. He supported his thesis by pointing out the poor quality
of American leaders in his time &.fu compared to
the Founders of the Constitution.
He claimed
that there are also no other obstacles to the
omnipotence of the majority in the law of the
United States.
He explained this lacl< of
obstacles in the following way:
When a man or a party suffers an
injustice in the United States, to whom
can he turn? To public opinion? That
is what forms the majority.
To the
legislative body?
It represents the
majority and obeys it blindly. To the
executive power?
It is appointed by
the majority and serves as its passive
instrument. To the police?
They are
nothing but the majority under arms. A
jury? The jury is the majority vested
with the right to pronounce judgement
[sic]; even the judges in certain states
are elected by the majority. So, however, iniquitous or unreasonable the
measur~l which
hurts you, you must
submit.
De Tocqueville felt that the few constraints
that existed in the United States upon the majority were to be found outside the law in the
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society itself. These constraints included morality and religion, the lack of an administrative
bureaucracy (which in his opinion is one of the
tools of tyranny), and the role of lawyers as a
type 0~2 aristocracy that is acceptable to the
masses.
A fourth, and probably the most important
constraint, was that of the majority being tied to
locality and to the division of the national government with the state.
This constraint resembles the doctrine of enumerated powers and the
national-federal principle of the Founders.
De
Tocqueville,
however,
expounded
upon
this
principle and declared throughout Democracy in
America that American government had its beginning in the township. In this way he made the
idea of localism something that arose naturally in
America before it was ever <if:ficially part of the
law or constitutional doctrine.
De Tocqueville's combined thoughts led him
to see tyranny, rather than anarchy, as the
possible cause of democracy's demise.
This
tyranny is the result of the contention and strife
of factions and may gradually lead to a loss of
power that results in anarchy, but because a
society cannot remain long in anarchy, it will
revert again to tyranny, forming a continuous
24
cycle.
De Tocqueville, therefore, hypothesized, in
contrast to the Founders, that the great danger
to the existence of the United States as a democratic-republic would be not the weakness of the
union, but the strength of the union.
He postulated that the majority in the United States has
the capability of becoming so oppressive to minorities that the minority factions may eventually
oppose this oppression and retaliate, causi~ the
democratic system in American to collapse.
De
Tocqueville saw this danger as very real, and he
saw religion and morality as the only constraints
in society that could possibly be strong enough to
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Summary and Conclusion
Alexis de Tocqueville observed the effect of
U. S. laws and political institutions upon American
civil society approximately sixty years after the
founding of those laws and institutions.
In
contrast to the views of the American lawgivers,
de Tocqueville concluded neither the geographical
extension
of
the
United
States
nor
the
institutional
constraints
embodied
in
the
Constitution served to repress the violence of
factions and the tyranny of the majority.
What de Tocqueville did see as deterrents
were societal restraints, such as the basically
peaceful nature of the American majority, unaware
of its own strength, and the contributions of local
patriotism and of religion to national public
virtue.
In the matter of controlling factions,
de Tocqueville thought the effect of civil society
upon American laws was greater than the effect of
laws upon civil society.
There is some irony in the fact that
de Tocqueville's beliefs concerning tyranny of the
majority led him, a man who had privately denied
his own faith, to be more preoccupied with
religion and morality than were the American
Founders, most of whom were devoutly religious.
De Tocqueville's ideas on how public virtue and
morality serve a utilitarian function in the
preservation of democracy cause religion to
emerge as the overriding theme of his writings in
Democracy in America.
Modern critics of American politics, such as
Martin Diamond and Alexander Landi, disagree
with de Tocqueville and uphold the political
philosophy of Madison, Hamilton, and the other
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Founders on the subject of the extended republic.
More important, perhaps, is that de Tocqueville
and the Founders have each posed strong arguments, and their synthesis is really the crucial
point. Surely a democracy needs both good laws
and a virtuous populace. It needs both a strong
national government and state and local institutions that are closer to the people. The combined
thought of the Founders and of de Tocqueville
serves to make the national-federal principle one
of the most prominent of the checks and balances
of the American democratic system.
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